Omar Tonsi Eldakar
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology
oeldakar@email.arizona.edu
Ph: 607-624-6952 (cell)
Fax: (520) 621 9190
Office: Bio West 120
Mailing address: P.O. Box 210088, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721-0088
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Research Interests
Current Research
In social animals, exploitative strategies often create a paradox in which the most detrimental strategy for the group is also the most fit strategy within the group. This is also referred to as the tragedy of the commons (TOC), an outcome resulting from the unlimited access of individuals to a finite resource. In the typical evolutionary formulation, altruists benefit the group, selfishness undermines altruism, leaving many questions concerning how does altruism evolve in the ever-presence of selfishness.
Although typically reserved for food and other resource consumption, the TOC also applies to the over-exploitation of females as a mating resource. Males frequently diminish the long-term reproductive success of females in an effort to mate with them over the short-term. I investigate this conflict in the water strider (Aquarius remigis) using a multilevel selection approach. Similarly to the conflict between altruism and selfishness, high aggression males outcompete lower aggression males within groups, however groups comprised of less aggressive males have a greater reproductive potential than high aggression groups. My research program investigates selection at these multiple levels and how the movement of individuals influences these selection forces.
In my current research program, I investigate how the movement of females down the aggression gradient influences the population structure. We have shown that given the ability to disperse, females assort with lower aggression males favoring reduced aggression, however in conditions where dispersal is blocked, higher aggressive males gain the advantage. I am also investigating how the extreme isolation of individuals in groups caused by the ephemeral nature of some streams (reducing female assortment) can drastically influence selection on aggressive mating as compared to individuals of perennial streams.
Continuing research interests
As a sociobiologist, I maintain research interests in detangling the altruism paradox. Typical evolutionary models propose how altruism can evolve through nonrandom interactions, guarded cooperation and more recently punishment as a mechanism to curtail selfishness; I however have taken a very different approach. An often overlooked aspect of game theory is that not only do the altruists suffer in the presence of selfishness, but other selfish individuals also suffer as selfishness increases in frequency. I propose that selfish individuals have an evolutionary incentive to punish other selfish individuals, thereby increasing the proportion of cooperators for them to exploit and transforming selfishness in to a self-limiting strategy. This behavior might seem hypocritical in moral terms, but it makes sense as an evolutionary strategy. It can even be looked upon as a division of labor, or mutualism, whereby selfish enforcers protect a group of altruists, and act selfishly as compensation for their costly vigilance. I continue explore ‘selfish punishment’ in both theoretical models as well as empirical studies on human and non-human animals.
